& Banned From Court Unless Represented By A Licensed Attorney At Law
2018 ABQB 951 (Canlll) | Canlli
Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 951 (Canlil)
2018-11-21 File number: 1803 04569 Citation: Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 951 (CanLII),
Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta
Citation: Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 951
Date: 20181121 Docket: 1803 04569 Registry: Edmonton
Scotia Mortgage Corporation
- and -
- and -
Dean Christopher Clifford and 4240944 Manitoba Limited
Added by Order
Memorandum of Decision
of the Honourable Mr. Justice D.R.G. Thomas
I. Introduction  On October 1, 2018 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench received an annotated copy of a Order granted by Master Smart on June 7, 2018 in Scotia Mortgage Corporation y Landry, Alberta Court of Queen's Bench Docket #1803 04569. That Order is for the foreclosure of a residential property formerly owned by Vanessa Landry
2018 ABQB 951 (CanLII) | Canlil [Ms. Landry], declared that Scotia Mortgage Corporation [Scotia] takes immediate title to the property, and that the occupants of the foreclosed property had 30 days from service of the Order to vacate the residence.  The annotated version of the June 7, 2018 court Order received by the Court has the following text added to its front page:
1. the upper left corner has a handwritten blue ink title: “special Deposit”;
the center of the front page of the Order is marked in large handwritten letters in blue felt marker, angled so the text reads up and to the right: “Accepted In Exchange for settlement and closure of the
Accounting."; 3. in smaller handwritten blue ink, horizontally: “By: [illegible] - sole Beneficiary Deposit to Private
Estate RN 233 361 577 CA”; and 4. a handwritten number that may be an Alberta area telephone number.  In a decision reported as Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry, 2018 ABQB 856 (CanLII) [Landry #1], I concluded that the annotated Order was an attempt by Ms. Landry to execute an "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” [OPCA] (Meads y Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215) scheme that would "... make Ms. Landry's debt disappear as if by magic.”: Landry #1, at paras 4, 11-14.  OPCA are a class of spurious “pseudolaw” concepts which are sold to litigants by conman "gurus” who promise extraordinary but false benefits. Gurus' illusory promises include free money, debt elimination, “get out of jail free cards”, immunity from income tax, and "travelling" - unlimited motor vehicle use. OPCA ideas sound like law and use legal terminology and references, but are universally rejected by Canadian courts.  All OPCA are an abuse of court processes. The employing of OPCA strategies is a basis on which a court may impose court access restrictions through what is sometimes called a "vexatious litigant order": Meads y Meads; R v Fearn, 2014 ABQB 233 (CanLII) at para 49, 586 AR 182; Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII) at para 92, 590 AR 288, aff”d 2014 ABCA 444 (CanLII), 588 AR 303. Some OPCA ideas are so notoriously false that simply employing these concepts creates a presumption that a litigant appears in court for an abusive, ulterior motive: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 (CanLII), 368 Nfld & PEIR 80; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 (CanLII).  I concluded that Ms. Landry's submission of the annotated Order was a basis on which to investigate whether the Court should impose access restrictions under its inherent jurisdiction and on its own motion: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) at paras 14-25, 273 ACWS (3d) 533, leave denied 2017 ABCA 63 (CanLII), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37624 (2 November 2017). Paragraphs 15-26 of Landry #1 review the relevant law in relation to court access restrictions.  I ordered that the Court would conduct a review of whether Ms. Landry should be subject to court access restrictions on a document only basis, which is this Court's standard practice: Hok y Alberta, 2016 ABQB 335 (CanLII) at para 105; Stoney v 1985 Sawridge Trust, 2017 ABQB 436 at paras 60-62, appeal deemed abandoned (3 March 2018), Edmonton 1703-0195AC (Alta CA). Ms. Landry had until November 1, 2018 to make a written response: Landry #1, at para 27. Ms. Landry's creditors were also given an opportunity to provide evidence and submissions on this issue, with the same due date: Landry #1, at para 29.  That deadline is now past, and no materials have been received from Ms. Landry. However, counsel for Scotia did respond, and provided additional information which further explains Ms. Landry's OPCA activities, and disclosed the identity of her partner and likely mentor in this affair: notorious OPCA guru Dean Christopher Clifford.
II. Further OPCA-Related Evidence  Counsel for Scotia has provided several pieces of information relevant to my response to Ms. Landry's litigation activities.  First, in Landry #1, I concluded that Ms. Landry had not appeared to contest the foreclosure and transfer of title hearing. I came to that conclusion based on a court order granted by Master Smart on June 5, 2018 in the Scotia Mortgage Corporation v Landry action which indicated no one appeared for the respondent.  It turns out that was not quite correct. Counsel for Scotia has clarified that Ms. Landry did appear in Court on June 5, 2018, and after the order was signed, presented herself (in a manner), as well as documentation that attached an ounce of silver. That resulted in this exchange:
Landry: Do I get to say anything? Master Smart: Oh, who are you?
2018 ABQB 951 (CanLII) | Canlll Landry: I'm Vanessa Landry. Master Smart: Well I guess you should have come up, I don't know who you are. What would you like
to say? Landry: I have a security agreement and an abatement. I have an abatement. Master Smart: You have ... a declaration of a security agreement. Oh. Uh huh. So this is something that
you found on the web? Landry: Ah, no. Master Smart: No? Re an abatement to the process generally considered. So what is this supposed to do?
Oh, there's money. This is consideration for you to not to have to pay, is that what that is? You
don't know. Somebody helped you prepare this? Landry: Yes. Master Smart: Yes. Landry: Did you read the security agreement? Master Smart: Sure, so what you want to do is say well take this security agreement in lieu of my
actually paying on the mortgage ... I think that is what you're asking for today, aren't you? Landry: I'm here for the remedy sought. Master Smart: And what remedy sought is that? Landry: I don't know. Master Smart: You don't know? Landry: Do you know? Master Smart: Well, I can't tell from what you've got here. It seems to me what I suspect is ... I see, oh
yes, ok. Landry: I am the beneficiary for that legal title. Legal estate. Master Smart: Legal estate of what? Landry: Of the ... Master Smart: Of you. Landry: Do you see the ... Master Smart: Ok. Wow. An ounce of silver. Oh, ok. Alright. So what do you hope the outcome might
be today in light of your ... Landry: The remedy. Master Smart: The remedy that you seek. Do you know what ... Landry: I am the beneficiary of the ... Master Smart: Uh huh. So how does that help make the payments to the bank? Landry: It's already been paid, isn't it? Master Smart: Well, it's in arrears, that's what they just said. Landry: Well, did you read my ... Master Smart: Well, this purports to pay it, but it doesn't really, does it? Where's the money. We have
legal tender in Canada. Landry: That's the legal tender. Master Smart: Yeah, ok, well, it's not, so what were you hoping to have happen today? Let me tell you
what's being asked for today, so you understand. This is something called a high-ratio mortgage, which means that ... if the bank puts this up for sale, and so on, you have potential
personal liability. Landry: Not me. I'm the beneficiary. Master Smart: Well, you're Vanessa Landry?
Landry: I am the beneficiary of the estate.
• Master Smart: ... so you're not Vanessa Landry, then?
2018 ABQB 951 (Canlll) | Cantil Landry: I'm the beneficiary of the estate. Master Smart: Ok. Well, if you're not Vanessa Landry then you can sit down, because you have no
standing here. Landry: Ok. Ok. Master Smart: Since you're there, though, let me tell you the effect of the order of today. The effect of
the order today is to put title into the name of Scotia Mortgage Corporation. Your tenant will be served and will have 30 days from service to vacate the property. You will owe no other money under this mortgage, or whoever Vanessa Landry is, under this mortgage to the Scotia Mortgage Corporation. The debt is extinguished by operation of this order. So that's the effect of the order which I just signed.
We can return this actually to Ms. Landry, or, sorry, the beneficiary of Ms. Landry's estate.
You can take your paperwork back. Use that silver for something more useful. Thank you.  Although the document(s) and ounce of silver Ms. Landry presented to the Court are not before me, it is clear from this discussion that Ms. Landry had attempted to use OPCA documents as an alleged basis to discharge her mortgage debt. The language that Ms. Landry is “the beneficiary of the estate” is consistent with the abusive “A4V” ‘money for nothing' mechanism I identified in Landry #1, at paras 11-14.  Counsel for Scotia also indicated that Ms. Landry had not complied with the Order to vacate her former property, and required police assistance to effect that removal. Ms. Landry then re-entered the property, and police were needed a second time to evict her.  Finally, the bank has provided the Court with a document it received on August 30, 2018, titled: "SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE CEASE TRESPASS ORDER BREACH OF TRUST". This document is reproduced as Appendix “A”, though Ms. Landry's birth certificate number has been redacted. This unusual document confirms several points.  At the June 5, 2018 hearing, Ms. Landry acknowledged someone helped her with her OPCA materials. The SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE document identifies the individual who was assisting Ms. Landry in her pseudolegal attempts to evade her debt obligations: Dean Clifford, president of 4240944 Manitoba Limited Mr. Clifford is a notorious Freeman-on-the-Land guru, a person who promotes OPCA concepts for profit. I will later discuss Mr. Clifford in more detail.  Second, the SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE is clearly linked to the annotated court order since both reference the same item: “Private Estate RN 233 361 577 CA”. These are components of a larger scheme.  Third, the SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE explains the underlying theory behind Ms. Landry's 'money for nothing'scheme. It is anchored on the idea that there are two of her: Vanessa Amy Landry, the human being and beneficiary, vs VANESSA AMY LANDRY, an estate created by and associated with her birth certificate.  This dubious concept is often referred to as “Strawman Theory”, that individuals have two aspects, a physical flesh and blood body, and an associated immaterial legal doppelganger. Ms. Landry and Mr. Clifford call the shadow LANDRY an "estate”, but OPCA litigants use many fanciful names for this half of the duality. I am going to refer to it as the “Strawman”. You can distinguish Ms. Landry from her Strawman (or Strawwoman) by the upper and lower case of her name: Vanessa Amy Landry, human and “beneficiary”, vs. VANESSA AMY LANDRY, Strawwoman.  Strawman Theory is universally rejected by Canadian courts: Meads y Meads, at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 (CanLII) at paras 67-88,  DTC 5024; d'Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 (CanLII) at paras 57-70; Rothweiler y Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 (CanLII) at paras 10-17, confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 (CanLII) at paras 25-33; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 (CanLII) at paras 110-120.  In fact, Strawman Theory is so notoriously wrong (“fanciful”, “no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”) that, in Fiander v Mills, at paras 20-21, 40, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded that anyone who even uses the Strawman in court is presumed to act in bad faith, and for a "vexatious and abusive” ulterior purpose. A court that encounters the Strawman may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea. This rule from Fiander v Mills has been subsequently adopted in many Alberta cases, including Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629 (CanLII), 29 Alta LR (6th) 33; Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 (CanLII), 86 CPC (7th) 348, aff’d 2018 ABCA 14 (CanLII); Alberta v Greter, 2016 ABQB 293 (CanLII); Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency); Re Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 555 (CanLII), aff’d 2018 ABCA 14; Rothweiler y Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 (CanLII), litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 288 (CanLII), decision confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 (CanLII); d'Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 (CanLII), litigant
2018 ABQB 951 (Canlil) | Canlil declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 438 (CanLII); Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leadbetter, 2018 ABQB 472 (CanLII), litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 611 (CanLII); Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 475 (CanLII), litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 618 (CanLII); Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 (CanLII), litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 834 (CanLII); McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 493 (CanLII), litigant declared vexatious McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677 (CanLII).  Ms. Landry's use of Strawman Theory concepts creates the presumption that she litigates in bad faith and for ulterior purposes. Her failure to respond to Landry #1 confirms that conclusion.  The SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE also explains the source for the funds Ms. Landry claims provided "the remedy”, a free house. She and Mr. Clifford are accessing a secret bank account, the "Birth Certificate Trust Security”, which purportedly is associated with her birth certificate number. As was explained in Meads y Meads, at para 532-534, there is a commonplace but false OPCA idea that the Strawman and its birth certificate are linked to a “birth bond” bank account. Purportedly, these secret accounts are used to monetize the state after it abandoned the gold standard. In effect, citizens are enslaved as security for currency. Mr. Meads claimed his "birth bond” bank account contained $100 billion in gold and silver: para 538.  What Ms. Landry and Mr. Clifford are doing is using their magic paperwork to (purportedly) seize control of the "VANESSA LANDRY LIFE ESTATE” created by the “VANESSA ANY LANDRY Birth Certificate Trust Registered Security”. Mr. Clifford says he and his company have been assigned” this "Birth Certificate Cestui Que Trust" by “a Notarized Private Security Agreement”. Now, Mr. Clifford says his company is ordering payment of the outstanding mortgage from Ms. Landry's secret trust fund.  This strategy of making payments from a secret government-operated birth certificate account has a number of common names: “Redemption”, “Accept for Value”, or “A4V”. Canadian courts have considered and consistently rejected A4V claims, including: Re Boisjoli; Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700 (CanLII), 7 Admin LR (6th) 321; Bossé v Farm Credit Canada, 2014 NBCA 34 (CanLII), 419 NBR (2d) 1, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36026 (11 December 2014); Royer c Québec (Procureure générale), 2016 QCCS 2500 (CanLII), aff’d 2016 QCCA 1612 (CanLII), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37408 (27 April 2017).  Employing A4V schemes warrants a strict court response. In Meads v Meads, at para 584, Rooke ACJ stated:
... I conclude that any litigation or defence based on the pseudolegal A4V concept is inherently frivolous and vexatious. That favours full indemnification of a person who faces an A4V strategy, and punitive
and aggravated damages where the A4V strategy is advanced outside a litigation context. See also CIBC v Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 (CanLII), 166 ACWS (3d) 637.  But that is not all. Mr. Clifford also claims that he and his company are going to force police officers who “... violently and physically attacked the True Beneficiary while in the lawful Enjoyment and Use of Private Trust Property, and placed her in custody ... to cough up funds from their secret birth bond accounts in response to “... the harm caused to the True Beneficiary”...”. Similarly, the bank is notified “... all the Bank's assets past, present and future are hereby Attached Liened as Surety ...", and, like the police officers, “... the Birth Certificate Trust of President, Brian Porter, under Directors Liability ... are Liened for four times the sum certain value of ALL SECURITIES generated as a result of this matter ...".  This document thus does not simply claim to discharge Ms. Landry's debts. It also contains a counter attack.  OPCA litigants are known for making false property claims on bases like this, for example: Myers v Blackman, 2014 ONSC 5226 (CanLII), 2 PPSAC (4th) 318.  Needless to say, there is no such secret account, estate, or trust, brimming with cash, ready for the plucking. The entire “birth bond” concept is false. As Rooke ACJ observed in Meads v Meads, at para 543:
It is very unfortunate that any person would be so gullible as to believe that free money can be obtained by these theatrics, but nevertheless some, like Mr. Meads, appear unable to resist the temptation of wealth without obligation. One can only hope that in the future OPCA gurus will find A4V less attractive, and their risk-loving customers instead invest in alternative forms of speculation, such as
lottery tickets, which provide infinitely better prospects for return.  Like the Strawman, the idea that a birth certificate has special properties beyond documenting a birth is an idea which is so bad that simply raising this concept creates a presumption of bad faith, abusive litigation: Fiander v Mills, at paras 21, 37-40; Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation y Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 (CanLII) at para 47, 28 Alta LR (6th) 104; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), at para 73; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 399 (CanLII) at para 27; d'Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 (CanLII) at
2018 ABQB 951 (Canlll) | Canlll paras 68-70; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 (CanLII) at paras 91-92. Ms. Landry has not rebutted that conclusion.
This is a further strong indication that Ms. Landry's litigation activity is abusive.
III. Appropriate Court Access Restrictions for Ms. Landry  Landru #1, at paras 15-26 reviews the authority, relevant evidence, and factors that are applied by this Court when it considers whether to impose court access restrictions. In brief, the Court reviews litigation misconduct and other evidence to consider whether or not court access restrictions should be imposed to manage plausible future litigation misconduct with creative but proportionate steps: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) at para 36, Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 (CanLII) at para 45.  Ms. Landry's employing of OPCA strategies is a well-established basis for this Court to intervene and impose court access restrictions. I have already determined that the OPCA scheme Ms. Landry sought to apply was based on Strawman Theory, birth bond birth certificates, and A4V. That conclusion established that Ms. Landry's attempts to eliminate her debts at the June 5, 2018 hearing and via the annotated court order were made in bad faith, and for an ulterior motive.  In Bossé v Farm Credit Canada, Richard J of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal denounced A4V schemes as being so absurd that that they are automatically suspect. In that case a couple claimed their “Private Registered Setoff Bonds” made the US government pay off over a million dollars of the Bossés' debts from secret US Treasury accounts. Justice Richard wrote that just makes no sense:
... It defies logic that one could print out bonds for any sum of money, let alone significant amounts, and simply say to one's creditors "here, go away, you have been paid." I am convinced the Bossés knew this.
I conclude the same is true for Ms. Landry, her magic paperwork and the attached ounce of silver. Similarly, a few scribbles on a court order do not transform that document into a “special Deposiť” that earns a free house.  I conclude that Ms. Landry employing ‘money for nothing techniques which she knew or ought to have known had no basis in law is a strong basis for imposing court access restrictions.  A second important point is that OPCA litigation has a political aspect. OPCA litigants are motivated by a kind of self-destructive extremist political ideology that is reinforced in highly introspective, introverted community echo chambers’: Re Gauthier, at para 92. As I observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 (CanLII) at paras 72-73, 283 ACWS (3d) 55:
Judicial and legal academic authorities uniformly identify OPCA narratives and their associated pseudolegal concepts as resting on and building from a foundation of paranoid and conspiratorial anti government and anti-institutional political and social belief. These individuals are sometimes called litigation terrorists' for this reason. They may act for personal benefit, but they also do so with the belief they are justified and act lawfully when they injure others and disrupt court processes. Persons who advance OPCA litigation to harm others have no place in Canada's courts. ... Their next target can be anyone who crosses their path - government officials or organizations, peace officers, lawyers, judges, business employees - and who then offends the OPCA litigant's skewed perspectives. These individuals believe they have a right to attack others via the courts, they like the idea of doing that,
and they view their litigation targets as bad actors who deserve punishment. ...  The SPECIAL PRIVATE NOTICE indicates that Ms. Landry, through her proxy Mr. Clifford, intends to use OPCA strategies to conduct pseudolegal attacks on others: police officers, Scotia, and its president.  This combination of factors predicts Ms. Landry will plausibly engage in OPCA litigation, potentially against anyone who offends her beliefs in what are supposedly are her rights, and under an imaginary law. On that basis I conclude that broad court access restrictions are warranted, particularly since a requirement to obtain leave is a minor and proportionate imposition on Ms. Landry's access to the court: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 (CanLII) at paras 32-33; Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 277 (CanLII) at para 8, 515 AR 58; Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 (CanLII) at paras 26-29,  GSTC 17; Bossé v Immeubles Robo Ltée, 2018 CanLII 71340 at para 38 (NBCA).  I therefore on my own motion and under this Court's inherent jurisdiction order:
Vanessa Amy Landry is a vexatious litigant and is prohibited from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing, any appeal, action, application, or proceeding: (i) in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, or the Provincial Court of
2018 ABQB 951 (CanLII) | Canlil (ii) on her own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Court in which the proceeding is conducted.
Vanessa Amy Landry must describe herself in any application for leave or document to which this Order applies as “Vanessa Amy Landry”, and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym.
To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Vanessa Amy Landry must apply to a single appeal judge for leave to commence or continue the proceeding, and (i) The application for leave must be made in writing by sending a Letter addressed to the Case
Management Officer explaining why the new proceedings or the continuance of an existing
proceedings is justified. (ii) The Letter shall not exceed five double-spaced pages. (iii) The Letter is to contain no attachments other than, for a new proceeding, the proposed notice of
appeal, application or other proceeding. (iv) If the single appeal judge requires further information, he or she can request it. (v) The single appeal judge can respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing, or hold
the application in open Court where it shall be recorded. (vi) If the single appeal judge grants Vanessa Amy Landry leave to commence an appeal, Vanessa
Amy Landry may be required to apply for permission to appeal under Rule 14.5(1)(i). An application for permission to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Alberta Rules of Court and must be accompanied by an affidavit: a) attaching a copy of the Order restricting Vanessa Amy Landry's access to the Alberta Court of Appeal; b) attaching a copy of the appeal, application, or proceeding that Vanessa Amy Landry proposes to
c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed appeal, application, or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that it is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it; and d) indicating whether Vanessa Amy Landry has ever sued some or all of the respondents previously
in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars. To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench or the Provincial Court of Alberta, Vanessa Amy Landry shall submit an application to the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate: (i) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may, at any
time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or
proceeding be given to any other person. (ii) Any application shall be made in writing. (iii) Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be
accompanied by an affidavit: a) attaching a copy of the Order restricting Vanessa Amy Landry's access to the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, and Provincial Court of Alberta; b) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Vanessa Amy Landry proposes to issue or file or continue; c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it; d) indicating whether Vanessa Amy Landry has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars; e) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents; and
2018 ABQB 951 (CanLII) | Canlil
f) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding. (iv) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may:
a) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to:
(1) the involved potential parties; (2) other relevant persons identified by the Court; and
(3) the Attorney Generals of Alberta and Canada; b) respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing; and
c) hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs, and proof of payment of all prior cost awards.
An application that is dismissed may not be made again, directly or indirectly. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court.
Vanessa Amy Landry is prohibited from: (i) providing legal advice, preparing documents intended to be filed in court for any person other
than herself, and filing or otherwise communicating with any court, except on her own behalf; and (ii) acting as an agent, next friend, McKenzie Friend (from McKenzie v McKenzie,  3 All ER
1034 (UK CA) and Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, s 2.22-2.23), or any other form of representative in court proceedings before the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench
of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal. 9. The Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court
of Appeal shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Vanessa Amy Landry, unless: (i) Vanessa Amy Landry is a named party in the action in question, and (ii) if the documents and other materials are intended to commence or continue an appeal, action,